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Abstract: In this article, we integrate the attention-based view of the firm and the organizational 
ambidexterity literature to develop a perspective on the effects of unbalanced attention to both 
domestic and foreign expansion. We utilize the case of British supermarket Tesco’s expansions in 
the UK and USA to demonstrate divestment as an unintended outcome of unbalanced attention to 
both domestic and foreign markets. We demonstrate how emerging-market multinationals could 
learn from historical international expansion strategic failures by developed-country multinationals.   
 
 





Over the past few decades, one of the recurring themes in management literature has been the need 
for organizational ambidexterity (OA), i.e. the concurrent pursuit of exploitation and exploration 
activities to achieve sustainable competitive advantage (Lavine 2014). Indeed, some scholars have 
asserted that such a strategy is essential for firms competing in multiple international markets (see 
Raisch and Birkinshaw 2008). At the same time, the attention-based view (ABV) of the firm has 
cautions potential effects of such activities and the unbalanced attention to markets (see Ocasio 
1997). That is the scenario where paying too much attention to activities in a new market may take 
away some attention and resources from existing markets.  
The ambidexterity and ABV concepts have largely been treated in isolation despite clear 
potential benefits of cross-fertilization. The existing literature has failed to adequately explore the 
possible linkages and potential integration of the two concepts. Although organizational expansion, 
exploitation and exploration activities entail the allocation of time and resources to more than one 
competitive arena, e.g. home and overseas markets (Jones and Coviello 2005), scholars have 
surprisingly devoted little attention to how unbalanced attention and resource allocation to both 
domestic and international expansion could potentially lead to competitive disadvantage or in the 
worst case scenario business failure.  
Although attention allocation is not new to strategy and management scholars (Simon 1947), 
it remains unclear how unbalanced attention to two or multiple markets can play a role leading to 
divestment or business failure. Divestment may be prompted by poor performance of a subsidiary 
(Boddewyn 1979). This means that transnational corporations would consider divestment when a 
subsidiary continuously posts financial losses. It is not uncommon for huge financial investments in 
a new market to drain financial resources from existing markets. Declining financial capital for the 
subsidiary or the group gives firms the incentive to divest (Nyuur et al. 2017). These financial 
losses could be due to attention deficits or poor understanding of the markets concerned. It could 
also be as a result of poor strategic fit.  
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Indeed, firms are likely to divest foreign operations when they observe incongruent strategic 
directions leading to difficult coordination between headquarters and subsidiaries (Boddewyn 
1979). These often cause misallocation and misapplication of corporate resources and create 
strategic overlaps (Capron, Mitchell, and Swaminathan 2001). When entry into a new international 
market continue to drain firm resources without the necessary short- to long-term returns 
divestment becomes a strategic option for firms. 
The primary purpose of this article is to examine how unbalanced attention and resource 
allocation to both domestic and international expansion could lead to divestment or business exit. 
Specifically, we examine how environmental and management-related factors interact to create 
conditions for unbalanced attention and resource allocation leading to divestment. While early 
international business research concentrated on investments by developed-country MNEs into other 
countries (Aharoni, Tihanyi, and Connelly 2011), emerging market multinational enterprises 
(EMMNEs) are increasingly finding international opportunities in developed countries. Based on 
this, we demonstrate how EMMNEs could learn from developed country multinationals to improve 
their resilience and survivability. In developing the arguments, it is contended that expansion into 
multiple markets could lead to unbalanced attention and resource deployment leading to overall 
underperformance of both the focal and other market(s). Such a situation could, inadvertently, result 
in the neglect of existing markets (Amankwah-Amoah 2014; 2016).  
To illustrate the theoretical analysis, we examine the expansion of British supermarket 
Tesco in both the UK and US markets. We selected this case partly because it provides unique 
insights into the processes and outcomes of the expansion of the operations of MNEs. We also 
examine how the firm-level and environmental factors eventually contributed to divestment from 
the US market. In attempting to resolve this theoretical deficit, we integrate insights from the 
dynamic capabilities perspectives (Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997), the ABV of the firm (Barnett 
2008) and OA (Tushman and O’Reilly 1996) to develop a perspective of how unbalanced attention 
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and resource allocation to both domestic and international expansion could lead to 
underperformance.  
We present our arguments in four sections. First, we provide a brief review of the literature 
on the ABV and OA. Second, we discuss the research methodology. Third, we utilize the cautionary 
tale of expansion by Tesco in the both the UK and US markets to illustrate the theoretical analysis. 
Finally, we set out the implications of the analysis for theory and practice. 
An ABV and OA: A conceptual integration 
Our arguments are grounded in the ABV, dynamic capabilities and OA literatures. Following 
Ocasio (1997, 189) we define organizational attention as “the noticing, encoding, interpreting, and 
focusing of time and effort by organizational decision-makers.” Attention is viewed as a scarce 
strategic resource that can be deployed to attend to events and develop solutions (Hilgartner and 
Bosk 1988). However, organizational attention is dispersed across decision-makers within the 
firm’s context and activities (Hoffman and Ocasio 2001). Anchored within the attention-based 
perspective (ABP) is the principle of selective attention which contends that firms and industries 
“will selectively attend to some external events while ignoring others” (Hoffman and Ocasio 2001, 
415; Ocasio 2001). Existing theories of international business can be advanced by integrating 
choices made by decision makers with bounded rationality (Aharoni et al. 2011). It has been 
suggested that decision-makers’ ability to act is often constrained by limited information processing 
capacity and information overload, which leads to some changes in the external environment going 
unheeded (see Barnett 2008). 
Prior research has demonstrated that divided attention is more likely to result in limited and 
inadequate attention to opportunities in two or more markets (see Hoffman and Ocasio 2001). 
Under conditions of expansion into multiple markets and arenas, some events may attract the full 
attention of top executives, whereas others may go unheeded (McMullen, Shepherd and Patzelt 
2009; Hoffman and Ocasio 2001). Managers may also be blind-sighted to market(s) as a result of 
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inadequate attention. Strategic decision-makers may consequently and inadvertently end up 
ignoring pertinent national or cultural differences that could eventually lead to business exit 
(McMullen et al. 2009). Inadequate attention to each market may stem from the firm overstretching 
its competences and capabilities into new geographical spheres where it had limited knowledge and 
expertise (see Ocasio 1997). National cultural differences influence the management process 
necessary for organizational success. Managers can use cultural profiles to understand the 
motivations of consumers in a given country. A supermarket, for example, needs to conduct 
adequate research about the culture and shopping habits in a country in order to be successful 
(Deresky 2014).  
A stream of research has also indicated that cross-cultural misunderstanding is likely to stem 
from inadequate attention that could hamper resource allocation (Cavusgil, Knight and 
Riesenberger 2012). In essence, motivations and expectations may be misconstrued. This could lead 
incongruent marketing and merchandising efforts. Such misallocation of financial resources could 
lead to operations at home suffering from attention deficits because executives, inadvertently, focus 
on foreign growth and new market expansion. Therefore, the pursuits of both domestic and foreign 
expansion require a high level of expertise to achieve the right balance (see Amankwah-Amoah and 
Debrah 2017; Ocasio and Joseph 2005). This requires in-depth understanding of how cultural 
differences could influence consumer motivations and expectations.  
One relevant theoretical lens is the dynamic capabilities perspective. By dynamic 
capabilities, we are referring to “the capacity of an organization to purposefully extend, create, or 
modify its resource base” (Helfat et al. 2007, 1). Dynamic capabilities also relates to the capacity to 
adapt through well-developed internal knowledge transmission, socialization and motivational 
mechanisms (Gooderham 2007). To an extent, dynamic capabilities can be viewed as a firm’s 
ability to develop and manage a network of value chain activities in different markets and locations 
(Prange and Verdier 2011).  
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It has been suggested that a firm’s ability to compete and succeed in a foreign market is 
predicated on its ability to acquire and utilize market knowledge (Osabutey, Williams and Debrah 
2014; Sapienza et al. 2006). Thus, dynamic capabilities can equip firms with knowledge making the 
firms resilient. By resilient, we are referring to firms’ ability to design robust systems to learn and 
withstand environmental upheavals, setback and failure in new markets (Lengnick-Hall, Beck and 
Lengnick-Hall 2011). Becoming a resilient organization requires strategic responses to changes in 
the business environment (Hamel and Valikangas 2003).  
Following Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004, 375) we define OA as “an organization’s ability to 
be aligned and efficient in its management of today’s business demands while simultaneously being 
adaptive to changes in the environment.” Partly rooted in the notion of ambidexterity is that 
internationalization entails the ability to concurrently explore and exploit markets to deliver 
sustainable competitiveness at home and abroad (He and Wong 2004). A central tenet of this theory 
is that an ambidextrous firm should be able to engage, competitively, in both exploitation and 
exploration activities in multiple markets (Amankwah-Amoah, Chen, Wang and Khan, 2019; Cao, 
Gedajlovic and Zhang 2009). Although there are competing demands for firms to spread risks, 
increase market share and tap into opportunities in foreign markets, there is also a need to ensure 
that such expansions do not divert attention from domestic operations. Poorly strategized and/or 
implemented international expansion is likely to weaken competitive position at home (see 
Duhaime and Grant 1984). It is worth noting that deployment of resources and capabilities to 
domestic and international operations are often inextricably linked to outcomes. Failure in one arena 
can have devastating effects on the other.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
The crux of our arguments is that expansion entails resource deployment and attention 
allocation to both the home and host countries. Inability to strike the right balance is more likely to 
affect the business as a whole, ultimately, contributing to divestment or exit from the market. Figure 
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1 demonstrates the concurrent pursuit of domestic and foreign expansions and the possible effects 
for firms. We seek to fill this gap in the literature by using the contrasting cases of Tesco’s 
expansion in the UK and the USA. 
RESEARCH METHOD 
We adopted a historical approach which has been found to be particularly effective when exploring 
such complex international business activities that have transcended past periods with antecedents 
that have effects on present and future activities (Kotabe and Kothari 2016). The study relies on 
archival records which refer to “documents made or received and accumulated by a person or 
organization in the course of the conduct of affairs and preserved because of their continuing value” 
(Ellis 1993, p. 2). Indeed, archival data often represents a “critical and under-utilized research 
resource” which can be utilized by researchers to develop and advance a perspective on past events 
(Forbes and Kirsch 2011, 589). The primary aim of this study was to develop a new perspective on 
the subject rather than test theory and, as such, a single case firm was considered suitable for 
producing a deep and rich understanding (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007). The case of Tesco’s 
expansion provides an opportunity to examine the firm’s strategy, decisions and processes.  
Following Augier, March and Marshall (2015), a range of sources were utilized to help 
establish the evolution of the firm’s expansion, attention and resource deployments, motives and 
consequences. The present research draws mainly from detailed examination of Tesco’s PLC’s 
Annual Report from 2007–2013, websites and statements. In addition, we examined historical data, 
such as the press releases, investors’ reports, online databases, newspaper reports and statements 
made by top executives including the CEO. To identify additional information, we employed the 
names “Tesco” and “Fresh and Easy” to search major databases including Informs, Business Source 
Complete, Sage, Wiley, Springer, Emerald, ScienceDirect and JSTOR. This search identified a 
number of relevant materials that were analyzed by the authors. These approaches helped to 
develop a chronology of the firm’s investments, motives and outcomes. We glean evidence from the 
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archival data by employing the content analyses processes of data reduction, data display, and 
drawing and verifying conclusions (Miles and Huberman 1994). We identify key historical themes 
and factors that contributed toward the divestment. Below, we present these findings.  
A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF TESCO’S EXPANSIONS 
Historically, Tesco had accumulated a substantial loyal customer base at home, in Britain. This 
served as a springboard to expand across the globe. One of the distinctive sources of its competitive 
advantage has been its adoption of a range of formats, including Superstores and Tesco Express. In 
recent decades, the retailer has been able to achieve UK dominance building its market share from 
around 20% in 1997 to 30% in 2011. Since the late 1990s, Tesco had also overtaken Sainsbury's as 
the UK’s leading supermarket by jettisoning its traditional base and diversifying its portfolio of 
activities (The Economist 2005b). Buoyed by unparalleled success at home, from the mid-1990s, the 
firm stepped up its quest to become a dominant player in the global industry and expanded into 
countries such as Turkey and Poland. Although Tesco initially expanded into geographically close 
markets such as Ireland and France by acquiring stakes in firms, such as the Three Guys chain in 
1979 and Catteau in 1992, it has since expanded its geographical scope to multiple countries in 
Europe and Asia (Palmer 2005). Since the 1990s, the supermarket has also diversified its offerings 
to include clothing, telecommunications and financial services. In addition, it began to utilize own-
branded ranges such as “Tesco Finest” and “Tesco Value” to offer comparatively low-priced 
products to consumers (Nenycz-Thiel and Romaniuk 2012).  
The dominance of the ‘Big Four’ UK supermarkets (Tesco, Sainsbury’s, Asda and 
Morrison’s), together representing roughly 75% market share, led to the Competition Commission’s 
probe (Competition Commission 2008). However, the probe uncovered that there was intense 
competition and a wider range of products that had contributed to around a 7% decline in food 
prices in real terms from 2000 to 2007 (Competition Commission 2008). This depicts increasing 
hyper competition at home. At this point, Tesco had emerged as one of the largest retailers in the 
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world with global operations spanning multiple countries. Consequently, Tesco was, appreciably, 
diversifying product range and competing on multiple fronts at home and, at the same time, 
expanding internationally. Such a strategic expansion requires attention to multiple issues and 
geographical locations. To succeed, Tesco needed to possess the dynamic capabilities to exploit and 
explore the opportunities whilst dealing concurrently with emerging challenges both at home and 
abroad.  
The dominance of Tesco in the UK market encouraged the decision to expand into the US 
market. At the time of entering the US market with the Fresh & Easy stores in 2007, Tesco was 
Britain's biggest supermarket and the third largest in the world (Smith 2007). As The Economist 
(2005a, 54–55) puts it, “When retailers achieve a dominant position at home the appeal of growing 
overseas can seem strong”. Some observers also believed that Britain's largest supermarket chain 
would bring about a revolution in the way Americans shop and eat. As such, it was also projected 
by TNS Retail Forward, a Columbus, OH-based consulting firm that Tesco could become a $4 
billion firm in the USA with an estimated 500 stores and projected sales of around $10 billion by 
2015 (Food Logistics 2007). However, this failed to materialize. We explicate some of the 
underpinning factors below. 
Tesco in the USA: The evolution of Fresh & Easy 
One of the motives for the expansion of Tesco into the USA was the firm’s desire to compete 
profitably alongside traditional hyper-marketers, such as Walmart and Costco, in their own territory 
(Lofstock 2013). After a period of deliberation, the firm decided to enter the market and proclaimed 
that it was ready to compete (Smith 2007). Arguably, Tesco assumed that its demonstrably OA and 
related dynamic capabilities that have resulted in success in Europe and Asia could be duplicated 
elsewhere. Perhaps, Tesco assumed too much similarity between the UK and US markets. Despite 
its relative success at home, there were doubts about its ability to break the stranglehold of global 
giants such as Walmart and Target in the market. The Economist (2007a, 77–79) described the 
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attempt as an “audacious bid to change the way America shops and eats” and a “closely watched 
experiment in global retailing.” Prior to entry, Tesco’s CEO, Sir Terry Leahy was reportedly noted 
as saying:  
“Clearly it's high risk … But we've carefully balanced the risk. If it fails it's embarrassing. It 
might show up in my career [and] it'll cost an amount of money that's easily affordable by 
Tesco—call it £1 billion if you like” (Cited in The Economist 2007a, 77–79).  
To address the local knowledge deficit and develop a robust entry strategy, the firm sent 
some executives to stay with American families, observing their shopping and eating habits. In an 
effort to learn from the failed venture of other British firms in this market, the firm also assembled 
managerial and technical expertise and even “built a clandestine store inside a California warehouse 
to test the reactions of selected people” (Smith 2007,  nd). This was some kind of environmental 
scanning without alerting potential rivals to the details of its strategy. Prior to entering the US 
market, the firm spent a considerable amount of time and money on identifying locations for its 
stores, and acquiring information and knowledge on aspects of American life (Smith 2007). The 
Economist (2007a, 77–79) put it this way at the time: 
“Tesco is anxious not to tip its hand to competitors. When it tested the layout of a mock 
store in Santa Monica, it did so hidden from view in a warehouse. It stocked the shelves 
with food shipped in from America's East Coast and people were told it was just a film set. 
The secrecy and the speed with which Tesco is expected to open its new stores points to the 
risks.” 
All these activities, in tandem with competitors’ analysis, were geared towards ensuring a 
successful launch and entry into the retail sector. The executives sought to capitalize on the 
opportunities inherent in one of the largest and fastest-growing retail markets at the time. This 
approach was not new: In 2003, the firm embedded research teams within Japanese families to 
observe their purchasing and consumption behavior prior to acquiring the Japanese C Two chain 
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(Palmer 2005). In spite of the fierce criticism by sceptics, that the strategy to enter the USA was not 
well grounded (The Economist 2007b), the firm had confidence in the “experiments” that started in 
Phoenix, Arizona and then expanded to other cities including Las Vegas, San Diego and Los 
Angeles. The first opening in Arizona was followed by new stores in other cities with 100 sites at 
an estimated cost of around £250m a year ($500m) campaign.  
Arguably, the main challenge confronting the firm at the outset was how best to attract and 
retain customers given the intense competitive landscape. A unique feature of the business model 
was its focus on a convenience platform to reach a large segment of the population that had 
historically been overlooked by the big players. The network of neighborhood convenience stores 
format was seen as an attempt to present something distinctive to the US consumer and, thereby, 
enable the firm to gain a competitive edge (Lowe and Wrigley 2009). Here it was evident that 
executives had assumed too many similarities between buying habits of US and UK customers.  
After a period of struggle to gain a foothold in the market, Tesco eventually reached a deal 
to sell Fresh & Easy to a US-based private investment firm, Yucaipa Cos. On 26 November 2013, 
the firm completed the sale of Fresh & Easy to Yucaipa Companies LLC at a cost to Tesco of £150 
million (around $235 million) to allow the investor to take on the US liabilities of the firm, bringing 
to an end its venture into the US market (Gordon 2013,  B3). In announcing the closure, Philip 
Clarke, the then CEO of Tesco, noted that the decision was the best outcome for the stakeholders of 
both Tesco and Fresh & Easy. He added: “It offers us an orderly and efficient exit from the US 
market, while protecting the jobs of more than 4,000 colleagues” (Tesco 2013b, nd).  
The sale paved the way for Yucaipa to inherit Fresh & Easy’s 4,000 employees in 150 stores 
and its distribution and production network (Tesco 2013a). The abandonment occurred after the top 
executives concluded that the firm was no longer willing to deploy additional financial resources to 
the failed venture. In justifying the closure, Philip Clarke reportedly noted: “When you can’t see a 
13 
 
return in a reasonable timeframe, you call an end to it and move your energy elsewhere (Cited in 
Werdigier 2013, B4). 
 The USA exit has happened against the backdrop of similar failures by British firms; 
Sainsbury’s supermarket exited the same market in 2004, and Marks & Spencer acquired Brooks 
Brothers in 1988 and sold it in 2001 for less than a third of what it paid (Smith 2007; Osborne 
2001). Table 1 summaries key features in the evolution of Fresh & Easy. In the light of these 
observations, we delineate the other environmental and organizational forces that contributed to the 
exit.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
Overview of the surface and deep cultures 
Studies by Gupta et al. (2002) suggested investing in countries within a cultural cluster was likely to 
be more successful given the cultural similarities between countries such as the UK and the USA. 
However, there remain subtle differences often not captured by the study of cultural dimension.  
The differences between the two national cultures played a pivotal role in deciding the fate of Fresh 
& Easy. The overwhelming emphasis on “surface culture” rather than “deep culture” as a basis for 
strategy formulation and decision contributed to the exit. A number of factors help illustrate this 
line of thinking. At the time of entry, it was well established that whilst the own-labels concept was 
relatively successful in the UK market, US consumers tended to be brand oriented and regarded 
“own labels as inferior products” (MacLaurin 1999, 107). Nevertheless, Tesco adopted an own-
labels approach in seeking to attract some customers. This oversight appeared to have allowed 
complacency to infuse into the strategic formulation phase. The firm’s low-cost approach and own-
brand labels proved difficult to sell to consumers’ partly due to consumers’ association of own-
brand labels with poor-quality products. Another unusual model to the American consumers was the 
use of “only self-checkouts” in the stores (Morris 2013). The Fresh & Easy model of convenience 
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stores was “based on the company’s Tesco Express or Metro stores in Britain, though with a local 
twist that Tesco prides itself on using in international markets” (Smith 2007, nd). The building of 
convenience stores followed the successful model in the UK that offers products such as fresh 
produce, grab-and-go drinks and prepared meals, bringing small convenience stores to 
neighborhoods in the USA (Martin 2008). This was a shift from the traditional model which 
emphasized building superstores. It also enabled the firm to distinguish its offering from the 
established rival firms in the market.  
At the outset, the company sought to fill a gap in the US market by seeking to provide 
affordable food services to consumers. The company was seeking to offer “smaller-scale but still 
offer full-service alternatives to full-size supermarkets” (NFNM 2011, 6). However, the 
Fresh & Easy stores’ adoption of a convenience-focused format was seen as “representing a 
significant threat to the U.S. food retailing industry as the concept offers smaller stores, easy access, 
more ready meals and ‘grab-and-go’ items” (Food Logistics 2007,  100). This was surprising given 
that American consumers have traditionally been helped by store assistants with bagging (Morris 
2013). Consequently, the concept of convenience and fresh produce failed to appeal to the US 
consumer (Gordon 2013). Tesco’s deviation also required a fundamental shift in consumers’ 
attitude and willingness to accept the new model. The dominance and success at home appeared to 
have blind-sighted decision-makers to these differences. The quote below summarizes the key 
issue: 
“Unlike the world of clothing, where a global consumer culture has created global brands 
such as Zara, Gap and H&M each with thousands of stores across the world, the 
internationalization of grocery retailing is constrained by the way that food tastes and 
shopping habits differ vastly from country to country” (The Economist 2007a, 77–79). 
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Adaptation to environmental conditions and events 
One of the problems of Tesco entry into the USA can be traced to the sudden change in the 
economic conditions surrounding the firm’s decision in 2006 to establish the store in 2007. The 
global recession that followed altered the economic landscape and costumer purchasing power. The 
venture was viewed as a “step-change in both scale and risk profile of its international expansion” 
(Lowe and Wrigley 2009, 332). The sub-prime crisis deeply affected the business, leading to falling 
demand and declining living standards (Lowe 2013). This unforeseen external factor altered the 
competitive landscape and created conditions which made it extremely difficult for the firm to 
succeed. This exogenous force ushered in a new economic environment that altered the dominant 
logic at the time of entry that the economic growth in the USA and beyond was likely to bring 
success to the firm. Although it is routinely claimed that market research is more likely to improve a 
firm’s chances of success, such sudden changes within an operating business environment are 
difficult to predict and made failure more likely. In 2009, Sir Terry Leahy, the then Tesco CEO, 
recognized the effects of the recession in the USA on the firm’s operations and poor timing of its 
entry strategy. In the annual report, the firm noted that: “The economic environment into which we 
originally launched the business has markedly changed” (Tesco 2009, 11). 
The firm at this stage appeared to have identified the recession as a major external variable 
that contributed to the sub-performance and its inability to gain a foothold in the US market. Indeed, 
they previously endorsed the current course of action and may have become increasingly reluctant 
to acknowledge to shareholders that the strategy had failed. The firm made various attempts to 
deploy additional financial resources to strengthen its market position. By late 2010, there was 
urgent need to integrate and improve operational efficiency of the subsidiary. In 2011, Tesco’s 
annual report attributed part of the loss-making operations to:  
“…the initial costs of integrating our two dedicated fresh food suppliers, 2 Sisters and Wild 
Rocket Foods, and exchange rate movements. These businesses have now been fully 
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integrated with our existing kitchen operations, with substantially improved financial 
performance, product quality and service levels” (Tesco 2011, 25). 
By 2012, it became increasingly clear that amidst calls within and outside the organization 
to de-escalate its commitment to this failing course of action, Tesco announced a decision to 
undertake a strategic review. In announcing the strategic review of Fresh & Easy in December 
2012, the CEO, Philip Clarke, noted: 
“We’re considering all options for the business, but it’s likely that the review will lead to 
Tesco exiting the US market … when Tesco announced plans to open a business on the west 
coast of the US in 2006, the global economy was flying; not even the brightest economists 
in the world could foresee the unprecedented crisis in the markets about to engulf the world” 
(Clarke 2012, nd). 
The European retail model 
Tesco adopted the European retail model where consumers tend to make more frequent trips to food 
stores. This was in contrast to the situation in the USA where consumers tend to visit less frequently 
but rather prefer bigger trips (Lowe 2013). In 2011, some of the problems uncovered with the 
business model in the USA included “confusion among consumers about the points of competition, 
the stocking of Tesco store brands in place of U.S. national brands, and the use of refrigerated 
ready-to-eat meals instead of the frozen ones Americans are more used to” (NFNM 2011, 6). These, 
in tandem with competitive pressures from “everyday low prices” from Walmart and other grocery 
retailers, made it difficult for the firm to succeed. The adoption of the innovative approach by Tesco 
triggered a range of strategic responses from the existing firms. Indeed, as a pre-emptive response 
to Tesco’s entry, Ralphs, a chain owned by Kroger, opened a new store in Irvine, California to try to 
tap opportunities inherent in the “convenient format” (The Economist 2007b). Indeed:  
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“Competition in the region stepped up in reaction to Tesco's arrival. Walmart hired David 
Wild, a former Tesco executive, to help it counter the British invasion. Aldi, the German 
discounter, announced plans to open stores in California, Fresh & Easy's heartland” (Butler 
2012, nd). 
 In the succeeding years after the entry, the firm began to experience a sharp decline and 
entrenched high cost base affecting its ability to achieve profit. Although the firm shrunk the trading 
losses by 18% in the financial year 2011/2012 (Tesco 2012), this was not adequately significant to 
change its fortunes. By the time of exit from the US, the firm’s market share at home had shrunk 
and sales growth was comparably much lower than what it was before entry into the USA and 
relative to rival firms at home. The announcement reflected the declining market conditions and the 
firm’s inability to generate a quick turnaround. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
Although “Tesco cannot be accused of poor preparation” (Butler 2012, nd), the company 
“grossly” misjudged US consumer habits, contributing to the eventual exit from the market 
(Werdigier 2013). Notwithstanding these, the firm’s ability to achieve success was constrained by 
other external factors. One of the most prominent and unintended outcomes of the expansion was 
the limited attention to the domestic market. As the firm expanded and devoted attention to the US 
and other domains, rival firms such as Sainsbury plc and Morrison’s Supermarkets adopted 
extensive growth strategies in the UK resulting in gaining market share from Tesco. Sainsbury’s, in 
particular, was relatively successful in winning customers from the firm. At the time of exit in 2013, 
the firm had seen its market share decline to 30.2% from 30.9% in the previous year. This was 
partly attributed to increasing competition from rivals at home and limited attention to domestic 
operations over a number of years (The Week 2013). In announcing the exit from the USA, the firm 
committed itself to expand and develop its operations in the UK. Based on the above analysis, 
Figure 2 depicts the process and stages in striking the right balance to deliver international success.  
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The article sought to examine how unbalanced attention and resource allocations to both domestic 
and international expansion could lead to divestment or business exit. We developed an ABP of 
expansion to shed light on how a firm’s inability to devote a balanced attention to both foreign and 
domestic expansion can lead to divestment and overall negative effects on its operations. We then 
employed the illustrative case of Tesco’s expansion in the US and the UK to illustrate the 
theoretical analysis. The case demonstrates the supermarket’s quest to simultaneously introduce 
innovative approaches to shopping to American consumers, whilst at the same time reducing 
attention to maintain strength at home.  
There are two dimensions to our findings. The first set of findings relates to the approaches 
taken and the decisions taken within the firm. These include the store format, locations of the stores 
and high upfront cost, which made it difficult to sustain long-term losses. These decisions were 
influenced by a misunderstanding of cultural differences by misconstruing ‘surface culture’ and 
‘deep culture‘ in countries that are culturally similar. The second set of the findings suggested that a 
host of environmental factors, such as the recession, sudden changes in the economic climate and 
competitive responses by rival firms, made it difficult for the firm to succeed in the US market.  
Our analyses indicate that Fresh & Easy accumulated losses to the point that Tesco was no 
longer able to sustain the resource requirements to give it the chance of success in the US market. 
The venture in the USA drained the resources of the firms and deflected attention from the urgent 
need for reform and further expansions on the domestic front. Tesco’s exit from the USA is not 
uncommon as many global companies are increasingly exploring divestment as a means of ensuring 
efficient utilization and deployment of their limited resources (Mankins, Harding and Weddigen 
2008). 
Our study makes at least two contributions to the literature. First, we integrate insights from 
the ABV of the firm (Barnett 2008; Ocasio 1997) and OA (Tushman and O’Reilly 1996) to develop 
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the concept of an ABV of expansion. Second, our conceptualization of the literature and findings 
lend support to the contention that an expansion into foreign markets has the potential to impact 
negatively on domestic operations, if managers deploy more resources and attention towards a 
venture which does not succeed. These findings broadly lend support to the general assertion that 
unbalanced attention to two key markets may lead to suboptimal performance (see Hoffman and 
Ocasio 2001). Our study echoes the well-developed notion in strategy that unique resources and 
attention are essential in achieving sustainable competitive advantage (Barney 1991). We also use 
Tesco as a case to illustrate the notion   that the theoretical tripod comprised of OA, dynamic 
capabilities and ABV must coexist to produce successful concurrent domestic and international 
expansion.  
Our study offers some useful practical implications. First, our findings stress the importance 
of understanding ‘deep culture’ rather than ‘surface culture’ as the basis for strategy formulation. 
The perceived similarities of the two national cultures may have resulted in misjudging consumer 
preferences and made managers complacent with respect to their understanding of ‘surface culture.’ 
Consequently, the unique aspects of the ‘deep culture’ were overlooked. In addition, our findings 
provide evidence of the need for EMNEs to view divestments not as failures but rather an 
orchestrated attempt to review a firm’s operations and to ensure efficient utilization and deployment 
of existing resources. In a sense, it is a strategic realignment of organizational resources. Such steps 
often become necessary when a unit continually drains resources from other units to the extent that 
it affects resource allocation to the business group as a whole. In addition, EMNEs could appreciate 
the challenges involved in international expansion and the need to develop the required dynamic 
capabilities that would be able to appreciate how cultural differences and other external 
environmental changes can influence international business success. EMNEs can also learn that the 
pursuit of international expansion must be supported by stronger market position at home and that 
internationalization must seek to balance the attention to domestic growth at the same time.  
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Despite our contribution to the ABV and ambidexterity literature, the findings could be 
made more robust if some of the limitations of the study are considered. First, our study is based on 
a single case of a large MNE based in UK. Accordingly, we could not explore whether such 
experiences differ across markets. We also offer little insight on how country-of-origin could have 
implications for the decision-making processes. Future research should involve multi-country cases 
to elicit new perspectives. A multi-sector studies could also reveal newer insights. In particular, 
studies that shed light on how this phenomenon is at play with respect to EMNEs could shed light 
on if emerging firms are developing the dynamic capabilities required for such international 
expansions. Additionally, there is a need to broaden the scope of the conceptual model to 
incorporate more possible factors than have been included here.  
The findings suggest a number of other promising avenues for future research. One might 
examine, for instance, whether divestments are more or less likely to occur in countries that are 
culturally and socially similar. Our analysis relied solely on secondary data; it might be very useful 
for future studies to use in-depth qualitative or quantitative firm-level data to help enrich our 
understanding of the subject. Last, future research could examine whether firms that persist in such 
markets in the face of poor performance are eventually able to generate a turnaround.  
REFERENCES  
 
Aharoni, Y., L. Tihanyi, and B. L. Connelly. 2011. “Managerial Decision-making in International 
Business: A Forty-five-year Retrospective.” Journal of World Business 46 (2): 135-142.  
Amankwah-Amoah, J. 2014. “Old Habits Die Hard: A Tale of Two Failed Companies and an 
Unwanted Inheritance.” Journal of Business Research 67 (9): 1894–1903. 
Amankwah-Amoah, J. 2016. “An Integrative Process Model of Organizational Failure.” Journal of 
Business Research 69 (9): 3388–3397. 
Amankwah-Amoah, J., and Y.A. Debrah. 2017. “Toward a Construct of Liability of Origin.” 
Industrial and Corporate Change 26 (2): 211–231. 
Amankwah-Amoah, J., X. Chen, X. Wang, and Z. Khan. 2019. “Overcoming institutional voids as a 
pathway to becoming ambidextrous: The case of China’s Sichuan Telecom.”  Long Range 
Planning. 52 (4): 101871 
21 
 
Augier, M., J.G. March, and A.W. Marshall. 2015. “Perspective—the Flaring of Intellectual 
Outliers: An Organizational Interpretation of the Generation of Novelty in the RAND 
Corporation.” Organization Science 26 (4): 1140-1161. 
Barnett, M. 2008. “An Attention-based View of Real Options Reasoning.” Academy of 
Management Review 33 (3): 606–628. 
Barney, J. B. 1991. “Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage.” Journal of 
Management 17 (1): 99-120. 
Boddewyn, J. J. 1979. “Foreign Divestment: Magnitude and Factors.” Journal of International 
Business Studies 10 (1): 21-27. 
Butler, S. 2012. “Tesco's Fresh & Easy Becomes Latest In Line of UK Retail Failures in US.” 
Available at: www.theguardian.com/business/2012/dec/05/tesco-fresh-easy-uk-retail 
(accessed 20 December 2013). 
Cao, Q., E. Gedajlovic, and H. Zhang. 2009. “Unpacking Organizational Ambidexterity: 
Dimensions, Contingencies, and Synergistic Effects.” Organization Science 20 (4): 781–
797. 
Capron, L., W. Mitchell, and A. Swaminathan. 2001. “Asset Divestiture Following Horizontal 
Acquisitions: A Dynamic View.” Strategic Management Journal 22 (9): 817-844. 
Cavusgil, S.T, G. Knight, and J. Riesenberger. 2012. International Business: Strategy, 
Management, and the New Realities. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Clarke, P. 2012. “Strategic Review of Fresh & Easy.” Available at: 
https://www.tescoplc.com/talkingshop/index.asp?blogid=81 (accessed 20 December 2013). 
Competition Commission. 2008. The Supply of Groceries in the UK Market Investigation. London: 
Competition Commission. 
Deresky, H. 2014. International Management: Managing Across Borders and Cultures (Texts and 
Cases). (8th ed). London: Pearson.  
Duhaime, I. M, and J. H. Grant. 1984. “Factors Influencing Divestment Decision-Making: Evidence 
From A Field Study.” Strategic Management Journal 5 (4): 301–318. 
Duncan, R. 1976. “The Ambidextrous Organization: Designing Dual Structures for Innovation.” In 
The Management of Organization, eds. R.H. Killman, L. R. Pondy., and D. Sleven, 167–
188. New York: North Holland. 
Eisenhardt, K. M, and M. E. Graebner. 2007. “Theory Building from Cases: Opportunities and 
Challenges.” Academy of Management Journal, 50 (1): 25–32. 
Ellis, J. ed.1993. Keeping Archives. 2nd edn. Melbourne: D.W. Thorpe. 
Food Logistics. 2007. “Tesco's Fresh & Easy: A Threat to Retailers?” 100: 8-9. 
Forbes, D, and D. Kirsch. 2011. “The Study Of Emerging Industries: Recognizing And Responding 
to Some Central Problems.” Journal of Business Venturing, 26 (5): 589–602.  
22 
 
Gibson, C. B, and J. Birkinshaw. 2004. “The Antecedents, Consequences, and Mediating Role of 
Organizational Ambidexterity.” Academy of Management Journal, 47 (2): 209–226. 
Gooderham, P.N. 2007. “Enhancing Knowledge Transfer In MNCs: A Dynamic Capabilities 
Driven Model”, Knowledge Management Research and Practice, 5 (1): 34-43. 
Gordon, K. 2013. “U.K.'s Tesco Set To Extract Itself from Fresh & Easy.”  Wall Street Journal, 
2621: B3. 
Gupta, V., Hanges, P.J., and Dorfman, P. 2002, “Cultural Clusters: Methodology and Findings”, 
Journal of World Business, 37 (1): 11-15.  
Hamel, G, and L. Valikangas. 2003, “The Quest for Resilience”, Harvard Business Review, 81 (9): 
52-65. 
Haq, H. U. 2017. “Trapped in a Vicious Circle: Can Low-weight Subsidiaries Get Headquarters’ 
Attention?” Critical Perspectives on International Business 13 (2): 166-179. 
He, Z.-L. and P.-K. Wong. 2004. “Exploration vs. Exploitation: An Empirical Test of 
Ambidexterity.” Organization Science, 15 (4): 481–494. 
Helfat, C., Finkelstein, S., Mitchell, W., Peteraf, M. A., Singh, H., Teece, D. J, and S. Winter. 2007. 
Dynamic capabilities: Understanding Strategic Change in Organizations. Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Hilgartner, S, and C. Bosk. 1988. “The Rise and Fall of Social Problems: A Public Arena Model.” 
American Journal of Sociology, 94 (1): 53-78. 
Hoffman, A. J, and W. Ocasio. 2001. “Not All Events Are Attended Equally: Toward a Middle-
Range Theory of Industry Attention To External Events.” Organization Science, 12 (4): 
414-424. 
Jones, M. V, and N. E. Coviello. 2005. “Internationalization: Conceptualizing an Entrepreneurial 
Process of Behavior in Time.” Journal of International Business Studies, 36 (3): 284-303. 
Kotabe, M. and T. Kothari. 2016. “Emerging Market Multinational Companies’ Evolutionary Paths 
To Building A Competitive Advantage From Emerging Markets To Developed Countries,” 
Journal of World Business, 51 (5): 729-743. 
Lengnick-Hall, C.A., Beck, T.E., and M. L. Lengnick-Hall. 2011. “Developing A Capacity For 
Organizational Resilience Through Strategic Human Resource Management,” Human 
Resource Management Review, 21 (3): 243–255. 
Lavine, M. 2014. “Paradoxical Leadership and the Competing Values Framework.” Journal of 
Applied Behavioral Science, 50 (2): 189–205 
Lofstock, J. 2013. “Fresh, But Not So Easy.” Convenience Store Decisions, 24 (1): 8.  
Lowe, M, and N. Wrigley. 2009. “Innovation in Retail Internationalization: Tesco in the USA.” 
International Review of Retail, Distribution and Consumer Research, 19 (4): 331–347. 
23 
 
Lowe, M, and N. Wrigley. 2010. “The “Continuously Morphing” Retail TNC During Market Entry: 
Interpreting Tesco’s Expansion into the United States.” Economic Geography, 86 (4): 381–
408.  
Lowe, R. 2013. “The Mistake Many British Retailers Have Made Is to Treat the Us As One 
Country.” Available at: //www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-22168463 (accessed 20 December 
2013). 
MacLaurin, I. 1999. Tiger by the tail: A life in business from Tesco to Test cricket. Basingstoke: M  
Mankins, M., D. Harding and R-M. Weddigen. 2008. “How the Best Divest.” Harvard Business 
Review 86 (10): 92-99. 
 Martin, A. 2008. “Miles of aisles for milk? Not here.”  New York Times, Sep 9: A1. 
McMullen, J. S., Shepherd, D. A. and H. Patzelt. 2009. “Managerial (in) Attention to Competitive 
Threats.” Journal of Management Studies, 46 (2):157-181. 
Miles, D. C., and Huberman, A. M. 1994. Qualitative Data Analysis (2nd ed.), Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage. 
MMR. 2013. “Tesco sells Fresh & Easy and exits U.S. Market.” 30 (15): 1. 
Morris, R. 2013. “Fresh & Easy failure: Can UK Firms Make It in the US?” Available 
at://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-22168463 (accessed 20 December 2013). 
Nenycz-Thiel, M, and J. Romaniuk. 2012. “Value-for-money perceptions of supermarket and 
private labels.” Australasian Marketing Journal, 20 (2): 171–177. 
NFNM (Natural Food Network Magazine). 2011. “Tesco Struggles with Fresh & Easy.” 7 (2): 6.  
Nyuur, R. B., J.  Amankwah‐Amoah, and E. L. Osabutey 2017, “An Integrated Perspective on 
Foreign Ethical Divestment,” Thunderbird International Business Review, 59 (6): 725-737. 
Ocasio, W, and J. Joseph. 2005. “An Attention-Based Theory Of Strategy Formulation: Linking 
Micro And Macro Perspectives In Strategy Processes.” Advances in Strategic Management, 
22: 39–62. 
Ocasio, W. 1997. “Towards An Attention-Based View of The Firm.” Strategic Management 
Journal, 18 (S1):187–206. 
Osabutey, E.L.C., Williams, K., and Debrah, A.Y. 2014. “The Potential for Technology and 
Knowledge Transfers between Foreign and Local Firms: A study of the Construction 
Industry in Ghana.” Journal of World Business, 49 (4), 560-571. 
Osborne, A. 2001. “M&S accepts $225m for Brooks Bros.” Available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2743194/MandS-accepts-225m-for-Brooks-Bros.html 
(Accessed 13 December 2012). 
Palmer, M. 2005. “Retail Multinational Learning: A Case Study of Tesco.” International Journal of 
Retail & Distribution Management, 33 (1): 23–48. 
24 
 
Prange, C, and S. Verdier. 2011. “Dynamic Capabilities, Internationalization Processes and 
Performance,” Journal of World Business, 46 (1): 126–133. 
Raisch, S., and J. Birkinshaw. 2008. “Organizational Ambidexterity: Antecedents, Outcomes, and 
Moderators.” Journal of Management, 34 (3): 375–409. 
Sapienza, H. J., Autio, E., George, G, and S. A. Zahra. 2006. “A capability perspective on the 
Effects of Early Internationalization on Firm Survival And Growth,” Academy of 
Management Review, 31 (4): 914–933 
SCTWeek. 2013. “Tesco Pays Investor To Take Over Fresh & Easy.” 18 (37): 37. 
Simon, H. A. 1947. Administrative behavior: A study of decision-making processes in 
administrative organizations. Chicago: Macmillan. 
Smith, C. S. 2007. “British Grocer Set To Dip Toe in U.S. Market.” New York Times, June: B7. 
Teece, D. J., Pisano, G, and Shuen, A. 1997. “Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management.” 
Strategic Management Journal, 18 (7): 509–533. 
Tesco. 2008-2012. Tesco PLC Annual Report and Financial Statements 2008. Cheshunt, 
Hertfordshire: Tesco. 
Tesco. 2013a. Tesco PLC Annual Report and Financial Statements 2013. Cheshunt, Hertfordshire: 
Tesco.  
Tesco. 2013b. “Tesco sells Fresh & Easy to Yucaipa.” Available at: 
http://www.tescoplc.com/index.asp?pageid=17&newsid=804 (accessed 20 December 2013). 
The Economist. 2005a. “Growing pains.” 375 (8422): 54–55.  
The Economist. 2005b. “The Parable of the Supermarkets.”  376 (8438): 13. 
The Economist. 2007a. “Fresh, But Far From Easy.” 383 (8534): 77–79. 
The Economist. 2007b. “A Tesco in Every Town.” Available at: 
http://www.economist.com/node/10063999 (accessed 20 December 2013). 
The Week. 2013. “Tesco under Pressure from Rivals as Market Share Falls.” Available at: 
http://www.theweek.co.uk/business/55306/tesco-under-pressure-rivals-market-share-falls 
(accessed 20 December 2013). 
Tushman, M. L, and C. A. O’Reilly. 1996. “Ambidextrous Organizations: Managing Evolutionary 
and Revolutionary Change.” California Management Review, 38 (4): 8–30. 






















Key events in Tesco’s expansion and exit from the US Market 
Year Key events  
2006  February - Tesco announce strategic move to enter the US retail market. 
 Top management confident of success and overcoming initial constraints. 
2007  November 2007 - Tesco opens first Fresh & Easy stores. 
 Tesco opens 60 stores in first five months and 150 by the end of 2007. 
 Intense competition and strategic response by rival firms. 
2008  Global economic recession and its effects on the firm’s operations. 
 March 2008 – Board holds meeting in the USA to evaluate operating business environment.  
2009  The firm made a loss of £142m. 
 June 2009 – Tesco heavily criticized over policy of employing only part-time workers and resistance to unions. 
 CEO, Sir Terry Leahy, recognize effects of recession on operations and poor timing of entry. 
 Tesco report opening 115 stores. 
2010  Tesco establish 145 Fresh & Easy stores by end of financial year 2009/10. 
 CEO, Terry Leahy, announced intention to leave company in 2011.  
2011  Losses of company rose to £186m. 
 Firm had 175 outlets and suffered loss of around $900 million to date. 
 Firm expanded store offerings from 3,500 to 5,000 products. 
 New CEO, Philip Clarke, project profitability in 2013.  
 Firm intensify advertising campaigns and in-store bakeries in some locations. 
 March 2011 - new stores opened in Northern California. 
 Firm report deal to allow employees to work at least 20 hours per week and also support healthcare coverage. 
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2012  Firm admit failure in the US market and began taking steps to divest. 
 January 2012 - weak local economy and shrinking demand prompted temporary closure of 12 stores in Arizona, California and 
Nevada. 
 April 2012 - closures and efficiencies help to reduce operating losses to £153m. 
 December 2012 - new CEO, Philip Clarke, announce review of US chain stating that ‘all options were under consideration’. 
 The Loyalty scheme – Friends of Fresh & Easy – launched and accumulate two-thirds of a million active members. 
 Firm reduce trading losses by 18% for the first time and declare intentions to make changes to make Fresh & Easy profitable. 
 Total sales grew by 27%. 
2013  Tesco invested around $2 billion into venture. 
 Cost of venture was £1.2bn. 
 Tesco reach agreement with Yucaipa Cos. private investment firm; to sell Fresh & Easy. 
Data sources: synthesized by the authors from: Tesco 2008- 2012; 2013; NFNM 2011; MMR 2013; Lofstock 2013; Gordon 2013; Lowe 2013; 
Morris 2013. 
